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Booklover
from page 45
One immediately feels they are reading a 
tragic Italian opera — how will it end?  This 
is the surprise.  Happy.  Yes, a happy ending. 
Costantino is released from prison after the real 
killer makes a death bed confession.  He returns 
to his village struggling with his fate and the 
fate of his now remarried wife.  A clandestine 
romance develops between Costantino and 
Giovanna (Now the title is understood.), but 
his thoughts turn to real murder.  
“At last the rain was ceasing; it still fell 
steadily, but more, now, like a gentle show-
er, while the wind had died down com-
pletely.  It was cold, though, and the damp, 
chill atmosphere hung over the cabin like 
a heavy wet cloth.  So unutterably dreary 
were the weather and the surroundings 
that Costantino, recalling the periods of his 
most acute misery, could never remember 
being so utterly and hopelessly wretched as 
now.  Not even on the day of the sentence, 
not even on the day when they had told 
him of the divorce, nor on that other day 
of his return: for on every one of those 
occasions, desperate as the outlook had 
been there alway remained the hope of 
better things in the life to come.  Then his 
conscience had been pure; but now, should 
he go on living, he believed that he would 
surely forfeit all hope in the life to come.  
At times, goaded by this horror, he would 
cry aloud, imploring death to come and 
save him, as a terrified child cries for his 
mother.” 
What Costantino does not know at this 
moment is that Giovanna’s husband Brontu 
had died as a result of severe burns.  Brontu 
fell asleep near the kitchen fire after returning 
home from a night of drunken foolishness. 
Giovanna and Costantino are soon reunited. 
More children are born, Brontu’s cruel mother’s 
heart is softened.  They live happily ever after.
“Giovanna is sewing, and hard by 
Costantino works at his bench.  No one 
speaks, but the thoughts of all are turned 
on the past.  In the middle of the common 
Mariedda (the child of Giovanna and 
Brontu) and Malthineddu (the child of 
Giovanna and Costantino) are playing 
together with gurgles and shouts of 
joyous laughter, as happy and uncon-
cerned as the birds on the neighbouring 
hedges.”  
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Fair use has been tested in court with in-creasing frequency in recent years, and many of these cases have revolved around 
the question of whether the use challenged can 
be reasonably viewed as “transformative” or 
not.  I traced the background in some earlier 
articles in Against the Grain, especially “Is 
‘Functional’ Use ‘Transformative’ and Hence 
‘Fair’? A Copyright Conundrum” (June 2009): 
https://scholarsphere.psu.edu/files/9880vr71h. 
There I particularly focused on the different ways 
the Ninth and Second Circuits had approached 
the interpretation of fair use, which seemed to 
portend eventual appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Readers not already familiar with the background 
might want to read that article before continu-
ing with this one.  I will also assume, in the 
interests of brevity, that readers of this journal 
will be generally familiar with HathiTrust, the 
Authors Guild, and the origins of this suit, filed 
in September 2011, which pitted these two main 
parties (with support from others) against each 
other in a battle to determine whether the mass 
digitization begun by Google and built upon by 
the HathiTrust participating libraries could be 
construed as fair use.  (It should be noted that 
“transformative use” was not at issue in the suit 
brought by three academic publishers against 
Georgia State because Judge Evans did not 
believe the copying under challenge there to be 
transformative.) 
The decision in the district court by Judge 
Harold Baer in October 2012 had largely 
favored the defendants, finding the alleged 
infringing uses to be fair mainly because they 
were all “transformative” and, further, made an 
“invaluable contribution to the progress of sci-
ence and cultivation of the arts” (which echoes 
the language of Article 1 of the Constitution in 
providing the rationale for having a copyright 
law in the first place).  The uses in HathiTrust 
involved making available the full texts of the 
digitized works but only for the purposes of 
text-mining and giving access to the physically 
disabled.  (The question of “orphan works” was 
set aside as not yet ripe for judicial resolution.) 
In making his ruling, the judge prominently 
cited several cases decided in the Ninth Circuit, 
thus for the first time narrowing the gap I had 
perceived in my earlier article between the two 
circuits on the interpretation of transformative 
use. Judge Baer’s decision was followed by 
another district court ruling in the Second Circuit 
in November 2013 by Judge Denny Chin in the 
parallel case that the Authors Guild had brought 
against Google.  Judge Chin also favorably 
quoted from Ninth Circuit cases in reaching his 
decision, which is now on appeal as well.
Much to my chagrin, in upholding Judge 
Baer’s ruling with respect to fair use regarding 
creation of a full-text searchable database, the 
Second Circuit  Court of Appeals has abandoned 
earlier Second Circuit precedent and instead 
bought into the controversial theory of the Ninth 
Circuit (some of whose key decisions it also cites) 
on functional use.  Instead of insisting on viewing 
the act of copying itself as needing to be creative, 
the court has accepted the Ninth Circuit’s idea that 
an otherwise “mechanical” act (similar to use of a 
photocopy machine) can be fair use if it “allows 
for” (the key words used by Judge Chin in his 
ruling in the Google case) creative use later.
The precedent on which I had been relying in 
my previous arguments was this passage written 
by Judge Jon Newman in the Texaco case:
We would seriously question whether the 
fair use analysis that has developed with 
respect to works of authorship alleged to 
use portions of copyrighted material is 
precisely applicable to copies produced 
by mechanical means.  The traditional 
fair use analysis, now codified in section 
107, developed in an effort to adjust the 
competing interests of the authors — the 
author of the original copyrighted work 
and the author of the secondary work that 
“copies” a portion of the original work in 
the course of producing what is claimed to 
be a new work.  Mechanical “copying” of 
an entire document, made readily feasible 
by the advent of xerography ..., is obvi-
ously an activity entirely different from 
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creating a work of authorship. Whatever 
social utility copying of this sort achieves, 
it is not concerned with creative author-
ship (italics added).”
I believed this to be a correct interpretation 
of Judge Pierre Leval’s idea of “transformative 
use” as elaborated in his classic 1990 Harvard 
Law Review article “Toward a Fair Us Stan-
dard”: http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/claw/
levalfrustd.htm.  To my mind, the “creation” 
of a full-text searchable database is no more 
“creative” than pushing a button on a photocopy 
machine and hence purely “mechanical” in na-
ture.  Of course, someone had to be creative in 
devising the process for mass digitization, just as 
someone had to create the photocopy machine in 
the first place, but the actual use of the process 
or machine is certainly not an act of human cre-
ativity itself, compared with the paradigm case 
of a scholar quoting from a previous work in the 
act of creating a new interpretation. 
The Second Circuit, with this new decision, 
has now effectively repudiated that line of rea-
soning and imported the Ninth Circuit approach. 
In my view, this strikes a terrible blow to the 
conceptual clarity of the notion of fair use.  Now 
courts will have to be engaged in an endless 
procedure of differentiating among a variety of 
functional uses as to which can be considered to 
comport with fair use.
Unless Judge Leval somehow manages to 
see the logic in Judge Newman’s ruling as a 
faithful interpretation of his theory and then per-
suade his fellow panelists on the Google appeals 
court to go along, I fear that the outcome of that 
case will also further entrench the Ninth Circuit 
view, which is doubly disastrous because this 
agreement will then provide no motivation for 
the Supreme Court to review any of these cases. 
I explained in a letter I wrote to Judge Chin 
in November 2013 where I think he went wrong 
in his reasoning in the Google decision:
In your analysis, you quote from Pierre 
Leval’s classic article suggesting that a 
new work is “transformative” if it “adds 
something new, with a further purpose or 
different character, altering the first with 
new expression, meaning, or message.”  
You go on to say:
Google Books does not supersede 
or supplant books because it is not 
a tool to be used to read books. 
Instead, it “adds value to the origi-
nal” and allows for “the creation of 
new information, new aesthetics, 
new insights and understandings.”
The key mistake here is located in the 
words “allow for.” That is not what Leval 
said.  He said that the act of fair use itself 
must consist in “altering the first with 
new expression, meaning, or message,” 
and Google’s computer-created indexing 
does not do that; there is no creativity in 
the functioning of Google’s computer 
algorithm.  It is, as Judge Newman put it, 
merely a “mechanical” procedure.
Why is this so important?  It is important 
because there are those who will exploit 
the notion of re-purposing, which cap-
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tures one part of Leval’s argument, to do 
real damage to the Constitutional purpose 
of copyright.  Like the Ninth Circuit, they 
will ignore the idea that the new work 
must itself come from an act of human 
creativity that adds new meaning, etc.
But the HathiTrust decision has now gone 
down this same road, and I suspect the Second 
Circuit will follow in this direction in the deci-
sion on appeal in the Google case.
However, the news is not all bad. In particu-
lar, the HathiTrust decision on appeal has chal-
lenged the notion that social utility itself suffices 
to render a use fair, in this respect echoing Judge 
Newman’s reasoning.
Contrary to what the district court 
implied, a use does not become trans-
formative by making an “invaluable 
contribution to the progress of science and 
cultivation of the arts.” … Added value 
or utility is not the test: a transformative 
work is one that serves a new and differ-
ent function from the original work and 
is not a substitute for it.
In this respect, the Second Circuit seems to 
be departing a bit from the Ninth Circuit ap-
proach, which famously proclaimed functional 
utility of a search process in the Perfect 10 case 
to be even more transformative than parody. 
“Google’s use of thumbnails is highly transfor-
mative” (emphasis added).  How did it justify 
this hyperbole?  Not only does a search engine 
provide “social benefit by incorporating an orig-
inal work into a new work, namely, an electronic 
reference tool. Indeed, a search engine may be 
more transformative than a parody because a 
search engine provides an entirely new use for 
the original work, while a parody typically has 
the same entertainment purpose as the original 
work.”  I trust that, with its repudiation of Judge 
Baer’s obeisance to general social utility, the 
Second Circuit would not go as far as the Ninth 
in enthroning pure functional re-purposing as 
“highly” transformative, even more than par-
ody (which of course directly involves human 
creativity).
It is further comforting that the court did not 
view digitization for the purpose of providing 
access to the print-disabled to be “transforma-
tive” either.  And its treatment of “audience” 
here may help university presses continue our 
fight against the ARL Code’s attempt to consider 
re-purposing of scholarly works, novels, etc., for 
a different audience of students as transformative 
and hence fair.   The court affirms the importance 
of the fourth factor, noting that “the only market 
harms that count are the ones that are caused 
because the secondary use serves as a substitute 
for the original, not when the secondary use is 
transformative.”  By denying that digitization 
for the print-disabled is transformative, and by 
holding that just expanding usage to a larger au-
dience is not transformative, the Second Circuit 
presumable would find the ARL argument to be 
unpersuasive, especially since digitized copies 
of monographs, novels, etc., would clearly be 
“substitutes” for the originals.
Here the Second Circuit reasons in much 
the way that David Nimmer does in presenting 
his theory of functional use.  As I argued in my 
earlier essay: 
Nimmer on Copyright proposes a “func-
tional test” as a means for deciding when 
certain uses are fair: “if, regardless of 
medium, the defendant’s work, although 
containing substantially similar material, 
performs a different function than that of 
the plaintiff’s, the defense of fair use may 
be invoked.”  One example given is where 
“unauthorized reproduction of chorus lyr-
ics of songs were held noninfringing fair 
use where such reproductions appeared 
in magazine articles” rather than in sheet 
music competing for the same market as 
the original.  This “functional test” was 
inspired by a suggestion from  Judge 
Richard Posner, who urged the recogni-
tion that “copying that is complementary 
to the copyrighted work…is fair use, but 
copying that is a substitute for the copy-
righted work…, or for derivative works 
from the copyrighted work, is not fair 
use.”  This approach, though it may seem 
superficially similar to the Ninth Circuit’s 
because of the reference to functionality, 
is in fact quite different. Rather than being 
tortured out of the notion of “transforma-
tive” use, this “functional test” is instead 
“viewed as an expansion of the fourth fair 
use factor…[and] vindicates the oft-cited 
assertion…that that factor emerges as the 
central fair use determinant, in result if 
not always in stated rationale.” Nimmer, 
like Weinreb, looks at some Supreme 
Court cases whose outcomes appear to be 
quite puzzling without being understood 
in terms of this “functional test.”
Consider the four Supreme Court 
cases decided under the fair use 
doctrine in the decade beginning 
in 1984.  Each of the three initial 
fair use factors defies characteriza-
tion that can consistently explain 
the court’s ultimate conclusion in 
those cases.  The first factor re-
veals conflicting impulses, wheth-
er scrutinized as to commercial use 
or to transformative use, or ac-
cording to the statutory preamble.  
On the commercial scale, Nation 
and Abend [Stewart v. Abend, 
1990] both disallow fair use for 
commercial uses, whereas Sony 
allows it in a noncommercial con-
text; but Campbell allows fair use 
for commercial exploitation.  On 
the transformative scale, Camp-
bell weighs in favor of fair use 
for a productive use, yet Nation 
and Abend rule against fair use 
for what is admittedly a productive 
use; even more strangely, Sony 
allows fair use for a nonproductive 
use.  In terms of the presumptively 
fair activities enumerated in the 
preamble to Section 107, the 
activity in Campbell constituted 
“criticism, comment,” and hence, 
inclines towards fair use, whereas 
the activity in Abend met none of 
the preamble specifications and 
was held unfair, both as expected, 
yet the activity in Sony fell into 
none of the preamble categories, 
and was nonetheless held fair; 
completely confounding expecta-
continued on page 49
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Questions & Answers — Copyright Column
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QUESTION:  A medical librarian in a non-
profit hospital asks about republishing a chart 
or graph in a book or journal article written 
by a doctor on staff.  The content is found in 
publications to which the library subscribes 
that are covered by its Copyright Clearance 
Center license.  Does this republication re-
quire permission from the copyright holder?
ANSWER:  Because the library has a CCC 
license, the answer to this question is controlled 
by the CCC license.  Typically, the license per-
mits sharing of content within the organization 
on intranets, in newsletters, and notification 
services but not outside of hospital employees. 
Republication in outside publications usually is 
not covered in the annual copyright license and 
requires permission for republication from the 
copyright holder, and the payment of royalties 
may be required.  The CCC license for the 
organization should be consulted, however, 
to determine if this outside republication is 
covered.
QUESTION:  A college librarian asks 
whether graphs, tables, and charts are subject 
to copyright protection.  Or is the information 
(facts) contained in them not so much created 
as observed?  If copyright protection does 
extend to data, is manipulating published data 
sufficiently transformative to become fair use?
ANSWER:  Graphs, tables, and charts are 
graphic works which normally are protected 
by copyright.  However, copyright extends to 
the expression of facts and data but not to the 
facts and data themselves.  The crucial deter-
mination is what might be protected in one of 
these works.  Typically, it is the selection of 
data or facts, the compilation, and the graphic 
design that qualifies for copyright protection. 
Someone else could take the data and create 
another way of depicting that data and produce 
a new work which does not infringe on the 
earlier chart or graph.  This is not even fair use 
but is simply the creation of a new work based 
on facts or data.
QUESTION:  An academic librarian in-
quires about the impact of the recent dispute 
publishers are having with Amazon over 
pre-orders and asks if there is a copyright 
issue.
ANSWER:  This dispute has been widely 
publicized by Hachette and other publishers 
(for one perspective on the publication see Berk-
shire Publishing’s description of the problem at 
http://us1.campaign-archive1.com/?u=f02106e-
baeb66b1fb28bf4adf&id=35f076f817&e=78d-
dc32ffc).  The dispute is actually a disagreement 
over distribution of books, how it is done, when, 
for what price, and at what discount to the 
distributor (Amazon).  Most authors who have 
written about this have sided with their pub-
lishers.  While distribution is an exclusive right 
of the author, it is typically the publisher that 
exercises the distribution right for books since 
most authors have transferred the distribution 
right to the publisher.  Further, authors seldom 
have the ability to distribute the printed copies 
of their works.  The argument is not over who 
has the right to distribute the works but the terms 
under which that will occur, so it is not really a 
copyright issue.
QUESTION:  A librarian in a for-profit 
educational institution is reviewing the library’s 
copyright policies and asks about the following 
statement concerning printed material 
(archives).  “Librarians may make up to three 
copies “solely for the purpose of replacement 
of a copy that is damaged, deteriorating, lost, 
or stolen.”  Copies must contain copyright 
information.  Archiving rights allow libraries 
to share with other libraries one-of-a-kind and 
out-of-print books.”  If one makes a copy for 
the reasons stated in the first quoted sentence, 
is that copy solely for archival purposes and 
thus must remain on the shelves, or may it be 
circulated as if it were the original?
ANSWER:  The first two sentences are 
absolutely correct.  They come from section 
108(c) of the Copyright Act.  Where the 
third sentence comes from is unclear. 
Libraries are permitted to replace lost, 
damaged, stolen, deteriorating or 
obsolete copies of works after they 
make a good faith effort to acquire 
an unused copy at a fair price.  A 
photocopied replacement copy may 
be circulated and used just as the 
original is used.  If one of the three 
copies made is digital, however, 
the digital copy may not be used outside the 
premises of the library.
Libraries do not have a general “archiving 
right.”  While making a copy (sharing) of a one-
of-a kind or out-of-print work at the request of an-
other library which is exercising its section 108(c) 
rights to replace a lost, damaged, etc., work would 
be permissible; “sharing” is not supported by the 
Copyright Act.  It is possible that this statement 
is referring to section 108(b) which relates only 
to unpublished works and not to either out-of-
print or one-of-a-kind works.  Under this section 
libraries are allowed to make up to three copies of 
an unpublished work for preservation or security 
or for deposit for research in another library.  The 
same in-library use restriction applies to a digital 
copy that is one of the three.
QUESTION:  The same librarian also asks 
about making copies of television broadcasts. 
The old policy states:  “Broadcasts of tapes 
made from television programs may be used 
for instructions. Cable channel programs may 
be used with permission.”
ANSWER:  This is a very odd statement. 
The first sentence is not correct even for non-
profit educational institutions!  Section 108(f)
(3) permits libraries to record television news 
programs, but only those.  The statute does not 
restrict it to broadcast programs, but it is likely 
that in 1976 this was what was intended.  So, 
recording television programs even for non-
profit educational institutions outside of the 
news must be with permission.  Some networks 
permit schools to record and reuse programs, 
however. Other networks sell video copies of 
programs which includes the right to perform 
them within the educational institution.  Under 
section 110(1) of the Act, nonprofit educational 
institutions may perform audiovisual works 
in face-to-face teaching as a part of a 
class, but this section is not applica-
ble to a for-profit institution.  The 
Copyright Clearance Center, 
in partnership with the Motion 
Picture Licensing Corporation, 
now licenses the performance of 
television programs, and this may 




tions, Nation dealt with 
protected “news report-
ing,” but nonetheless 
held against fair use.
The second factor likewise produces disparate results. Abend 
unsurprisingly disallows fair use for a highly creative work, 
yet Campbell and Sony allow the use for similarly creative 
works; and Nation seems totally out of kilter, disallowing 
fair use for a factual work. The third factor is likewise mixed. 
Campbell allows fair use for less than total copying, but 
Nation and Abend both disallow fair use for less than total 
copying; by contrast, Sony allows fair use for total copying!
Nimmer goes on to consider how the “functional test” fares better as 
an explanation for the outcomes of these four cases and concludes: 
“then the fourth factor, as expanded by the functional test, is cur-
rently the most reliable touchstone for performing fair use analysis.”
I think this kind of functional test supports the argument I have made 
against the ARL Code’s position, as in my essay “On the Use and Abuse 
of Transformative Use”: https://scholarsphere.psu.edu/files/sf268573n.  It 
seems to be compatible with the Second Circuit’s view.
So, in sum, while I regret the further muddying of the waters of concep-
tual clarity about transformative use that the Second Circuit has accepted, 
I believe that it still leaves open opportunities for us scholarly publishers 
to resist the most radical interpretations of transformative use that could 
cause us the most economic harm.  
